

MEMORANDUM FOR: HAK  
FROM: LSE  
SUBJECT: Cambodia and the Chinese

I recommend that our replies ~~(Tables A and B)~~ to the recent Chinese notes on Cambodia and the Peking trip be presented together by Brent Scowcroft, and that he make the following points orally at that time:

*August 16 date proposed by*  
-- The ~~invitation from~~ the Chinese side for Dr. Kissinger to visit *is inconvenient.*  
Peking ~~on August 16 cannot be accepted.~~ I hope the Chinese side will be able to accommodate our suggestion that alternative dates be proposed.

-- An early reply regarding visit dates would be helpful in arranging Dr. Kissinger's schedule.

-- The Chinese statement on Cambodia presented by Han Hsu has come as a shock to my Government. We particularly regret its tone, which is reminiscent of a period in our relationship that we thought had been put behind us.

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**TAB A**

The US side regrets that the August 16 date proposed by the Chinese for Dr. Kissinger's arrival in Peking is inconvenient.

It is suggested instead that the Chinese side propose two alternative three-day periods for a visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking: one falling within the dates September 1 to 15 and one beginning after September 28. In view of the large number of schedule commitments which are now pending, a reply at the earliest convenience of the Chinese side would be appreciated.

In view of press reports both in the United States and China speculating on the possibility of an early August visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking, the US side believes it necessary that both sides be prepared to respond to press inquiries relating to plans for the visit. The US side would be interested in the views of the Chinese side on responding to such inquiries.

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At a time when the Communist side is making a renewed and intensified effort to determine Cambodia's political future by force, the Chinese side's complaints about American military action are disingenuous. The US side and the Cambodian Government have consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement, and indeed since October 1970. The Communist side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and cynically responded to the Cambodian Government's unilateral ceasefire and cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive. In the face of this brutal military response to a genuine and concrete step to end hostilities in Cambodia, the comments of the Chinese side about US bombing ring very hollow.

The Chinese side solemnly declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it could communicate the US peace proposal to Prince Sihanouk. It was stated in the June 4 message, and reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

After a further delay of nearly two weeks, the Chinese message of July 18 is therefore most difficult to comprehend. There has been no change in US policy and no change in the situation to warrant this reversal of the Chinese position. In light of these earlier assurances, and the

principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is impossible to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to its Cambodian allies. (Prince Sihanouk's suggestion that the US communicate with him through Mauritania is particularly incomprehensible, since he is residing in Peking and since the Chinese side itself asserted in prior messages the inconvenience of communicating with Prince Sihanouk through similar channels while he was traveling.)

The US side notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese side has not honored a commitment it has made to the US side.


As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side is proposing that the US side give its formal assent to a plan of total surrender in Cambodia. The US side cannot accept a "solution" imperiously dictated to us. It is beyond the bounds of logic to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations.

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# Document Separator Sheet

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA



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PEKING 022

July 20, 1973

TO: HENRY KISSINGER  
FROM: JENKINS/HOLDRIDGE  
REF: Washington 19, Peking 021.

1. On careful reflection we resubscribe to previous message with only following to add:
2. Representatives of friendly governments here have repeatedly warned us not to expect that our startling honeymoon period would last forever. They say in effect: "the Chinese are uniquely disarming and personable, but also coldly practical. They are wary, with historical reason, of close relationships, even while leading one to believe that such are established. They are serious when they extol self-sufficiency and in dependence, to degree possible. They need the U.S., however, and your relationship will be firm so long as you do not seriously offend their sense of pride. If you do that, they will drop you even at great danger to themselves, for national pride is too recently regained and viewed as the indispensable cement of their extremely difficult-to-organize society (Sun Yat-sen spoke of the Chinese people as a pile of sand.) So far, all indications are that the U.S. has honored that concept with great skill. Don't flub it, for what you do in this regard matters a great deal to the rest of us."
3. We have not flubbed it. We can weather the present Chinese anger and doubt, to the degree they may exist. Chinese perplexity seems to stem from what they once told us in the context of Cambodia: "You risk sacrificing big things for small place."
4. No one here doubts U.S. power. As for U.S. fidelity, they tend to consider it as having been if anything already excessively proved. But we find no one here who believes U.S. power can be applied through Lon Nol or any Asian leader who will not even pay his troops, much less win the civilian population.
5. We estimate that: (1) The Chinese are at least temporarily peeved, partly for reasons unrelated to Cambodia; (2) They believe we have our priorities out of kilter to a degree which

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endangers their interests as well as (in their view) ours; but(3) They are by no means trying to scuttle us in Cambodia or elsewhere. It may or may not look different from Washington, but seems clearly that way here.

6. The Chinese may well reason that they can better afford to show pique now if they feel it, at least with regard to a limited segment of our spectrum of relationships. For they no longer believe a Soviet attack to be at all likely, or at least imminent, though the hatred and mistrust thrive thumpingly. We can no longer bank so much on the negative factors which threw us together originally, but must rely more on the positive, which is harder work. Fortunately, you have built on the latter well, and we are convinced that those positive factors look better and better to the Chinese. That is one reason they want the negative ones out of the way.

7. The Chinese also have a series of psychological reasons to be at an out of sorts with us. Our airlift plane, permission for which was a special courtesy, overflew a sensitive island of theirs, against clear routing instructions. The Marines wore uniforms and side arms against local custom and what the Chinese thought was a firm understanding. Our Congressional group displayed unbelievable insensitivity and the accompanying newsmen were at times short-sightedly presumptuous. Furthermore, the Chinese are acutely embarrassed by the complaints of their missions that we have received all sorts of special treatment in setting up the office and in favored living accommodations. The Chinese probably have to prove to others, and even more to some of their own gallery, that they are not in our pocket.

8. We interpret the Chinese message to us to be designed as much for Cambodian consumption as for ours, and perhaps even more so. If the Chinese are urging some concessions on the part of Sihanouk, which we believe likely, it is all the more important that they appear to the Cambodians to be adequately firm with us.

9. In sum, we believe we will win more by playing it cool, as a power so sure of itself that we are not likely to miss the big picture. The Chinese are wringing their hands lest in their view we do the latter in Cambodia.

10. In this situation, we have a few speculative thoughts on Sihanouks and Chinese roles in Cambodia which may be of some help to you:

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11. -- It appears very likely that Sihanouk has little or no influence with the Khmer insurgents (KI), and that he is accepted by them essentially in the capacity of a figurehead and as someone who can gain international standing for the KI cause. Sihanouk has said as much in press interviews, most recent being that given AFP correspondent Romensky on July 10, wherein he declared that his post-victory role would be that of Queen Elizabeth and that if "after a few weeks there is any incompatibility between me and the red Khmers, I will hang up my hat and retire."

12. -- If such is the case, Sihanouk's unwillingness to meet with you may be due in part to his inability to speak with any degree of authority on behalf of KI. Personal pique probably figures in as well, but the prince could be more concerned with avoiding the embarrassment which would arise if it became generally known that he could not really represent the KI in negotiations.

13. -- Accordingly, Sihanouk's recent insistence on our dealing directly with the KI, or "red Khmers", could be an admission that there is no alternative, either for him or for us.

14. -- Sihanouk continues to imply a degree of Chinese influence on the scene, however. In the Romensky interview, he acknowledged that they as well as North Vietnamese had indeed halted arms shipments since signing of Paris Agreement. (He has subsequently said he has asked Chinese to resume shipments and that they are prepared to do so once transportation through North Vietnam can be arranged). Sihanouk has also indicated that we could use Chou En-lai as an intermediary to put forward proposals for negotiations with KI, thus "leaving open a tiny door." Although he has since backed away from this by declaring that we should go through Mauritanian Chief of State, we doubt that this Chinese channel has entirely dried up.

15. -- If Chinese have now suspended arms and ammunition shipments to KI, this could be a sign that they are indeed trying to use what leverage they possess to help bring about a settlement. But if they are trying to be helpful, it will be in their own way. They will not tell us about it, and they will be operating within the limits imposed by their need to sustain Sihanouk and by what we judge in lack of direct PRC political control over the KI. They also may be up against a time factor, i.e., the pressures on them to resume arms shipments to the KI may be mounting as our bombing in Cambodia continues.

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16. We have weighed the advantage of phoning Mr. Bruce to suggest he may wish to return early. We concluded that if our two messages are not consonant with his thinking (from what we know we have no reason to believe he would differ significantly if at all) it would be better for you to receive his comments a bit later rather than alert the Chinese by open telephone call to what they would interpret as extra ordinary concern. Mr. Bruce plans return early evening Monday. Advise if you wish to request change.

17. Warm Regards. END OF MESSAGE.

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